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in post-conflict countries are intended to
transform the socio-political context that
led to violence and thereby build a stable
and lasting peace. Yet the UN’s transitional
governance approach to peace-building is
ill-suited to the challenge of dealing with
the predatory political economy of
insecurity that often emerges in post-
conflict societies. Evidence from peace-
building attempts in Cambodia, East
Timor and Afghanistan illustrates that
the political economy incentives facing
domestic elites in an environment of low
credibility and weak institutionalisation
lead to a cycle of patronage generation and
distribution that undermine legitimate and
effective governance. As a result, post-
conflict countries are left vulnerable to
renewed conflict and persistent insecurity.
International interventions can only
craft lasting peace by understanding the
political economy of conflict persistence
and the potential policy levers for
altering, rather than perpetuating, those
dynamics.
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Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has poured a great deal of
investment into the various dimensions of intra-state peacekeeping. The United Nations
(UN) has played roles in post-conflict states ranging from brokering and enforcing peace
agreements to, most expansively, comprehensive peace-building interventions applied
over a transitional governance period. In the latter approach, the UN works with domestic
elites to reconstruct state capacity and to build a democratic system, governing in
collaboration with domestic elites until a first election is held. The aim is transformative—
to lastingly alter the domestic political game by constructing the institutions of effective
and legitimate democratic governance that are the foundation of a sustainable peace.
I argue in this paper that the transitional governance approach has unintended
consequences that undermine the peace it is trying to build in post-conflict countries. The
model has been quite successful in implanting the formal administrative and
constitutional institutions associated with effective and legitimate governance, which
must be acknowledged as important steps towards state- and democracy-building. But it is
essential to consider the longer-term governance outcomes that result in order to truly
assess whether stable and lasting peace is built, and here the results are rather less
promising. Through comparative process-tracing of transitional governance outcomes in
Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, I illustrate that the UN’s peace-building strategy
has been ill-suited to the challenge of dealing with the predatory political economy of
insecurity that often emerges in post-conflict societies.1
In peace-building attempts in the three countries considered, the domestic elites
empowered by the international community during the transitional governance period
subsequently consolidated their holds on power in a zero-sum political-economic calculus
relying on predation and patronage. In essence, the peace-building process becomes co-
opted by domestic elites who use the legitimacy and power resources granted by
transitional governance, and the subsequent aid economy, to turn the state into an arena of
rent-seeking and distribution that is then employed in the struggle for political power. The
political economy calculus facing domestic elites orients them towards a patronage
generation and distribution system that undermines legitimate and effective governance
and underpins a cycle of persistent insecurity.
I situate my argument within the broader peace-building literature in the first section of
the paper, emphasising the need to import a political economy perspective. Second, I


































outline the research design employed, defining transitional governance and the outcomes
of interest. In the third section, I briefly trace the process of transitional governance in
Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan to illustrate that this form of peace-building is co-
opted into a domestic political economy of patronage. The fourth section elaborates on the
logic of this predatory dynamic and how it underpins persistent insecurity. A concluding
section sketches some theoretical and policy implications.
The peace-building scholarship: from process to politics
The study of the processes and implications of peace-building has proliferated as the
practices of peace-building have evolved over the past 20 years. This growing body of work
has yielded valuable contributions in terms of studying the multiple dimensions of conflict
management through negotiated settlements and peace processes, defining and
conceptualising peacekeeping and peace-building, cataloguing the implementation of
international peace operations, identifying some of the contextual factors necessary for
success in peace operation implementation and generating lessons learned for policy
application.2
Yet, given the proliferation of work on peacekeeping and peace-building, there remain
surprising lacunae in this field of study. In particular, scholars have tended to treat peace-
building as a process, emphasising the institutional contours of a peace settlement at the
time of its implementation to the neglect of truly assessing whether a stable and lasting
peace results in the longer term. Building on various sub-disciplinary perspectives, as I
sketch below, the peace-building scholarship has evolved from the initial set of largely
descriptive and policy-prescriptive assessments of peace-building interventions to develop
a deeper emphasis on the interaction of international and local actors and a more nuanced
approach to the politics of peace-building. Nevertheless, the literature tends to
inadequately capture the agency of domestic elites on long-term governance outcomes
because it under-emphasises the manner in which domestic political economy incentives
shape consequences.
The peacekeeping literature in international relations—on both inter-state and civil
wars—focuses for the most part on the factors that contribute to peace maintenance, or
the prevention of a return to conflict, and its duration.3 Although this is certainly an
important outcome to study, this lens restricts our understanding of causal mechanisms as
well as outcomes, since it focuses on the peace settlement and the choice of formal


































institutions but does not examine the subsequent domestic political outcomes that result
in the consolidation phase. Turning to comparative politics for insight on the domestic
dynamics of peace-building, it becomes clear that scholars have much to say about the
effects of elections and constitutional design on post-conflict peace as well as the
connection between peace-building and democratisation.4 While this focus on
institutional form is certainly warranted, it is essential to also explicitly consider the
interaction of institutions with the political environment in which they exist and the
agency of domestic elites who both control and are constrained by them.
Single country case studies of peace operations abound. These are rich in description
but they are rarely self-consciously theoretical and again underplay causal mechanisms and
the interaction of international peace-building strategies with the domestic political
environments in which they unfold. Another line of analytical inquiry focuses on the
machinery and processes of transitional governance itself—comparing the various
mechanisms through which the international community has attempted to aid weak,
failed and post-conflict states.5 These are often more operationally oriented evaluations of
state-building that focus on the case-specific, technocratic details of intervention, and are
largely descriptive and pre-theoretical. Many of these scholars acknowledge the
importance of political context, but their analyses tend to attribute success or failure of
UN-led peace-building exercises to the scope and implementation of the UN mandates
themselves.
The newest strand of the literature on peace-building has moved some way towards
taking a more theoretical approach towards the practice, the stance also adopted in this
paper. A number of scholars have developed critiques of the ‘liberal peace-building’ model
as practiced by the UN and the international community. Some have delved with a critical
lens into the meta-theoretical concerns that are inherent in the issue, questioning the
international community’s motivation in applying the conventional peace-building model
and the appropriateness of the model’s content—Weberian bureaucracy, liberal democracy
and neoliberal economics—in the post-conflict countries in which it is attempted. Others
have focused the critique on the model’s implementation in the form of ‘neo-trusteeship’
and the mechanics of international involvement and donor-driven assistance.6 What tends
to remain lacking is a focus on the domestic political dynamics that interact with the
content and mechanisms of the peace-building approach itself.7 The approach of peace-
building through transitional governance is not undertaken in a political vacuum even
when formal institutional structures have collapsed. On the contrary, peace-building is a


































hyper-political undertaking; and the political-economic incentives facing domestic elites
in the course of peace-building should be emphasised much as elite pacts and settlements
are highlighted in the democratisation literature.
In sum, in studying peace-building and defining its outcomes, analysts have tended to
focus on the processes and institutional forms comprising the practice of peace-building.
Some scholars have introduced the more agent-centred focus necessary to examine how
international and domestic actors bargain and interact. Yet the literature still tends to
suffer from a short-term focus, with an overemphasis on the institutional forms associated
with peace-building instead of deeper examination of the consolidated governance
outcomes that result. In order to truly understand whether peace-building approaches can
and do achieve their objectives of building sustainable and lasting peace, it is necessary to
fill this gap. One essential step towards doing so is to examine the political economy of
peace-building, the focus of this study.
What does it mean to bring a political economy perspective to the study of peace-
building? The study of intra-state conflict processes was revolutionised by an attention to
the economic incentives that faced warring parties and, subsequently, by the consensus
that economic and socio-political factors serve not as alternative explanations for conflict
but, rather, as complementary dynamics—greed and grievance—that interact in triggering
and sustaining conflict.8 The study of how societies end and recover from conflict requires
a similar emphasis on the political-economic motivations orienting the parties to peace, in
the context of the institutional forms that constrain them. To investigate the political
economy of peace-building is to pay careful empirical attention to the economic incentives
that shape and constrain elites’ political goals and strategies; and the political incentives
affecting their intention and ability to pursue broad-based economic development and
thereby deliver the benefits of peace across society.
I adopt such a political economy approach here, especially emphasising the ability of
elites to make credible commitments to each other and to the populace, and focusing on
the economic goods that elites must deliver to citizens in order to retain their political
support.9 In turn, this commands attention to how political and administrative
institutions shape time horizons and elite incentives; and to how the elites who control the
state deliver the benefits that underpin their compact with society. The liberal ideal
embedded in the UN’s peace-building model is that democratically elected elites will
aggregate collective social preferences and will use the state apparatus to deliver
programmatic policies and public goods and, thus, the shared prosperity that is a pillar of


































sustainable peace. The post-conflict reality, however—as illustrated in the empirical
section below—is that the political-economic incentives facing elites are such that it is
easier and more profitable for them to distribute public rents and patronage goods to their
clients in exchange for political support. Put simply, when time horizons are short and
citizens cannot hold elites accountable for their commitments to provide public goods,
elite incentives privilege narrow benefit provision to specific clients instead of public goods
that benefit all citizens. In doing so, furthermore, elites under these conditions can channel
their appeal to citizens through hierarchical patron-client networks, thus obviating their
own need to build credibility with the populace—through, for example, institutionalised
political parties—and undermining the formal structures of authority.10 This equilibrium,
I will demonstrate, not only privileges elites and their networks over society at large, it also
has adverse consequences for peace because it underpins a new form of persistent
insecurity.
A suboptimal political economy equilibrium of this nature may be relatively common to
new democracies suffering from weak credibility. Yet transformational peace-building
purports to build legitimate and effective governance—and this paper demonstrates that it
fails to do so because of the political economy dynamics put into play. The peace-building
approach itself weakens credibility to begin with by picking winners among elites, and the
resources it confers upon these elites are co-opted in a domestic political economy of
patronage through which predatory conflict and insecurity persist. To illustrate how this
occurs, I employ a process-tracing approach to understanding transitional governance and
its outcomes in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan.
Research design
Transitional governance is an attempt to forge sustainable peace in nations riven by civil
war by building state capacity and democracy in order to productively channel inter-group
conflict. The UN has never laid out an explicit model of transitional governance; hence, I
build an inductive definition, based on the mandates of the peace operations that attempt
this manner of transformative peace-building.11 A UN transitional authority or assistance
mission is mandated by the UN Security Council to assist with the implementation of a
negotiated peace settlement over a specified transitional period, typically two to three
years. The hallmark of transitional governance, distinguishing it from all other, less
transformational, versions of multidimensional peacekeeping is that the appointed


































mission is responsible to some degree for performing the executive functions of the state.
During the course of the transitional period the UN relies on a small group of domestic
counterparts to assist with governing over the transitional period and to provide some
form of domestic political participation in the process. Finally, the transitional period
culminates in a UN-organised national election for a constituent assembly, which then
agrees on a constitution and other core choices about institutional architecture and is
transformed into the national legislature of a newly (re)constituted country. While the UN
and international aid organisations remain involved in various forms of assistance, a
legitimate domestic government takes hold of the reins of administrative power. The UN
has pursued peace-building that conforms to this implicit transitional governance strategy
in only five post-conflict countries since the end of the Cold War—Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Croatia (Eastern Slavonia), East Timor and Kosovo.12
The transitional governance approach assumes that the international community can
help to build the institutional foundations for stable, effective and legitimate
government.13 International norms play a major role in shaping the formal institutional
outcomes sought by peace-building through transitional governance—the rationalised
bureaucracy that makes up the administrative apparatus of the state; and the liberal
democracy that has come, since the end of the Cold War, to represent the sole externally
legitimate form of domestic politics. International interventions in state- and democracy-
building are focused, in practice, on the construction of these formal institutional
structures of the administrative and political arenas. These institutional forms are,
nevertheless, laid down in local political contexts that necessarily affect governance
outcomes. The degree to which sustainable peace is truly built can be assessed only by
looking at the consolidated outcomes in terms of state capacity and democratisation.
Relying on the widely-used definition developed by Linz and Stepan, I consider democracy
consolidated when it has become—behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally ‘the
only game in town’.14 Similarly, we know a strong state and its hallmarks when we see them
in action—fromWeber onwards, the definition of the state has been primarily institutional
and centred around autonomous, rationalised bureaucracy. The building of state capacity
also requires development of the state’s reach in authority vis-à-vis society.15
How should we expect the transitional governance strategy to play out in dynamic
domestic political environments? In attempting this type of transformative peace-
building, the UN is trying to do something that has never been achieved: simultaneous
state- and democracy-building. If transitional governance worked, the rebuilt state would


































serve as an arena of authority and legitimacy to protect against the corruption of the
political process and nascent democracy. But, in practice, transitional governance
experiences have been co-opted, with the state becoming captured by domestic elites intent
on winning the political game. State capacity-building ceases since the rulers of the state
use it for patronage distribution; and democracy-building is thwarted by the use of
patronage resources to cement a hegemonic hold on power. The overall result is persistent
insecurity.
In order to demonstrate this pattern, I trace the process of how transitional governance
in Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan—the three developing countries with weak
institutional capacity in which the approach has been implemented—led to a series of
unintended political-economic consequences that centre around the generation and
distribution of patronage resources. Peace-building disappointments in post-conflict
states are characterised by equifinality; the odds are stacked against success and numerous
causal pathways can be identified in leading to failure. But process-tracing can be used to
identify a plausible causal chain—hence I employ a structured, focused comparison of the
three cases with an emphasis on developing within-case analysis using process-tracing to
strengthen causal inference.16 This idiographic approach rests on the rich case study
evidence available in published work and, where otherwise unattributed below, upon
about one hundred personal interviews conducted in Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor,
London, New York and Washington DC from 2005 to 2012.17 On the basis of this
empirical material, I inductively develop a theoretical framework to show how peace-
building interventions themselves transform the domestic political game as a result of the
political-economic incentives put into play.
Tracing the political economy of peace-building
In Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, domestic political elites interacted with the
UN over the transitional governance period to establish institutional arrangements
aspiring to effective and legitimate governance and tailored, to some extent, to local
political reality. Yet, in all three countries, longer-term governance outcomes have failed to
truly transform the political context to ensure peace. The contemporary Cambodian
political-economic equilibrium is one where the hegemonic ruling party quashes dissent
and controls all the levers of administrative and political power in a situation of grand state
capture. In East Timor, a nascent peace was upended by continuing elite factional battles


































that turned violent and the subsequent political-economic settlement remains
contentious. The situation in Afghanistan continues to deteriorate, as competing elites
maintain a pitched battle for control of the state and the country’s resources. Central to my
argument is the insight that the transitional governance approach itself was co-opted by
domestic elites in the service of these outcomes, providing a new set of power resources
and legitimacy for them.18 In subtly different ways, each country’s trajectory reveals how
the political-economic calculus facing elites oriented incentives towards patronage and
contributed to persistent insecurity.19
Cambodia
From 1970 onwards, Cambodia underwent two decades of political instability, civil war
and genocide, with the battle for political control over the country developing out of the
Cambodian state’s collapse of legitimacy. The conflict was ended by the Paris Peace
Accords of 1991, which included specific power-sharing provisions and provided a
roadmap for building democracy and the transition to an elected government. The United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was the first UN peace operation
to be mandated with both a degree of executive authority in governing the country—in
collaboration with the four major political factions—as well as the entire organisation and
supervision of an electoral process. The royalist party FUNCINPEC (the French acronym
for the National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative
Cambodia) won a plurality in Cambodia’s first post-conflict elections in 1993 but a
standoff with the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) led by Hun Sen resulted in a power-
sharing coalition between the two parties.
Subsequent governance outcomes in Cambodia have been dictated by two constraints
that UNTAC struggled with and failed to resolve: continued mutual hostility among
domestic factions that were far from reconciled; and the resilient power of the CPP, which
retained the control over the state apparatus it had originally won in 1979 as a Vietnam-
backed client regime during the civil war. As a result of these two factors, the 1993 electoral
coalition deadlocked decision-making instead of serving as the basis for legitimate
governance. Despite having won a plurality in the elections, FUNCINPEC’s governing
power was restricted to the cabinet level; the CPP retained its monopoly on administrative
power exercised through the state hierarchy. Having failed to secure electoral legitimacy or
an administrative power base, FUNCINPEC leaders instead mimicked the CPP in rent


































extraction and distribution networks, entering into ‘a tenuous compact among competing
patronage systems’.20 The power-sharing system thus failed to foster true reconciliation
among the factions. More perversely, it served in replacing outright elite conflict with a
dual system of rent-seeking and predation. Operating both within and outside the state,
these ‘[h]ierarchical patron-client networks [ . . . ] have expanded and subsumed the
formal state structure’.21
These patronage conditions have underpinned an ever-expanding dynamic of elite
predation, which continues to undermine democracy and state capacity. Both parties,
anxious to protect their patronage resources, have sought to ensure that their interests are
not threatened through reforms. In an outright power grab, Prime Minister Hun Sen and
his faction within the CPP finally staged a coup d’état in 1997, marking the breakdown of
the elite power-sharing system and the emergence of a de facto one-party system.22 With
the CPP now hegemonic, a ‘shadow state’ system has developed,23 where elites focus on
developing exclusive control over high-rent economic activity, thereby assuring their hold
on power. The army and police are complicit in the patronage system; having been granted
valuable resource concessions by the political elite, they ‘engage in an expanding array of
illegal and predatory activities’.24 In addition to highlighting the lucrative rent streams
from the country’s natural resource endowment, Cambodia scholars have also argued that
privatisation and marketisation reforms introduced in Cambodia in 1989 made the
expansion of patron-client networks both more possible and more profitable.25
Political elites have expanded their patronage networks vertically to accumulate
uncontested power at the subnational level and horizontally to include wealthy business
interests and military leaders, who control, together with politicians in mutually beneficial
arrangements, access to most of the country’s lucrative natural resources, including timber
and now oil.26 Preferred access to government procurement contracts is another channel
for rent distribution. As these predatory patterns have increasingly permeated the
country’s political economy, the role of violence and intimidation in influencing election
results has given way to an increasing reliance on patronage distribution aimed towards
uncontested political dominance.27 In this way, elite predation has replaced outright
conflict as the main avenue through which Cambodians experience insecurity and
vulnerability in everyday life.
The process of peace-building through transitional governance was co-opted into this
predatory political economy of insecurity. Building a sustainable and inclusive post-
conflict peace in Cambodia required the severing of the CPP’s administrative stranglehold.


































But the transitional governance strategy and the rush to elections led to precisely the
opposite result by first empowering the CPP as the UN’s de facto preferred working
counterpart since the UN saw the CPP as the only practical domestic interlocutor. UNTAC
then subsequently gave the CPP the stamp of legitimacy it fell short of achieving when it
failed to win the first election by standing by as it subverted those election results. As a
result, Cambodia continues to be governed by elites ‘whose monopoly on power has
remained mostly untouched since 1979’.28 UNTAC was simply unable to alter the domestic
political-economic landscape, as CPP elites successfully used the legitimacy bestowed
upon them by the international community to strengthen their grip on the institutions
and human resources of the state apparatus, and thereby to cement their holds on power
and enrich themselves over time. The lack of accountability has both undermined
democracy and ‘entrenched the threat of violence as an ever-present prop to the system’.29
The international community lost the opportunity to build a countervailing locus of
authority in Cambodia that could potentially prevail against a predatory political elite,
extend time horizons and reorient elite incentives towards public goods provision rather
than patronage, and thereby form the basis for lasting peace and security.
East Timor
The East Timorese people voted for their nation’s independence in 1999, following an
almost 25-year guerrilla resistance movement against Indonesian occupation. Responding
to the scorched earth violence and forcible deportations carried out by retreating pro-
Indonesia militia groups, the United Nations mounted its most ambitious ever peace-
building exercise, the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET).
Five years later, East Timor appeared on its way to a successful post-conflict transition, as
the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (FRETILIN, by its Portuguese
acronym) seized the mantle of the national resistance and channelled its grass-roots
strength into a democratically elected government. Yet during the transitional phase, elite
activities in the domestic political arena tended to be geared towards a winner-takes-all
approach, with FRETILIN in particular focused on asserting its control over the country
with minimal participation from other parties or civil society groups.
FRETILIN elites dominated the political process during and after the transitional
period, enabled to do so as a result of UNTAET’s indecision over political participation
and the sequencing of the ‘Timorisation’ of government.30 UNTAET remains the only


































peacekeeping mission ever mandated with full executive and sovereign powers over a
territory. Although it convened a series of national councils with which to consult,
UNTAET relied in practice on a small handful of Timorese to aid in decision-making—
many of whom were members of the FRETILIN elite who subsequently formed the
country’s first national government. FRETILIN was by far the most highly capacitated
national political party and, wanting to quickly assume power, advocated early elections.
Assuming the revolutionary mantle and legitimised by the UN, FRETILIN won a
majority of seats in the 2001 constituent assembly elections. Subsequently, it consolidated
its grip on power by manoeuvring through the political space circumscribed by the
transitional governance process. FRETILIN elites secured approval for their draft
constitution, which paid little heed to the popular consultations on the topic and
subordinated the president to the government, essentially neutralising the popular and
non-affiliated revolutionary leader Xanana Gusmão’s overwhelming victory in the first
presidential election. Next, FRETILIN successfully transformed the constituent assembly
into the country’s new national parliament upon independence, deftly avoiding the
prescribed second election that would have increased other parties’ weight in the legislature.
It then ‘placed the new National Parliament in clear subordination to a government intent
on using its majority to push through its ambitious legislative program’.31 It also quickly
began to consolidate its patronage networks throughout the country, in particular by
ensuring that civil service positions in district administration across the country were filled
with FRETILIN cadres.
Even with its grassroots support, FRETILIN’s specific goals were not necessarily shared
by the population at large. The party compounded a pattern of Timorese elitist political
behaviour that threatened true democratic consolidation; for example, it chose Portuguese
as the official national language, marginalising the educated, urban youth who were in the
process of forming an increasingly important political constituency of their own. Timorese
civil society representatives have criticised the country’s hierarchical and closed political
culture, pointing out that although it may have contributed to the success of a national
resistance movement it has since been detrimental to democracy. Eventually, FRETILIN’s
behaviour and institutional legacies compromised its legitimacy in the eyes of the people.
Politically motivated violence erupted in April 2006, reflecting deep and long-standing
political animosities among the elite, emerging state capture and competing patterns of
patronage behaviour, and a lack of elite efforts to engage with community and customary
forms of governance.32 This conflict turned violent as FRETILIN proved unable to assert


































legitimate control over armed groups and the leadership was forced out of office after
several months of severe political instability. Elections in mid-2007 made former president
Xanana Gusmão prime minister at the head of a volatile new coalition.
Under this coalition government, the elite-driven, hierarchical and patron-client nature
of politics in East Timor has continued to assert itself. Overlaid on the political culture is
the fact that East Timor is one of the most petroleum-dependent countries in the world,
with oil and natural gas revenues providing more than 98 per cent of government
revenues. Political elites have benefitted from the recent commodity price boom, reaping
the benefits of the patronage distribution made possible by the petroleum revenue stream.
In this respect, East Timor appears to be following a pattern familiar to rentier states, with
public sector hiring and pay increasing along with growing concerns over elite capture of
petroleum concessions and lucrative procurement contracts.33 Furthermore, in terms of
political patronage, preliminary analysis of the geographic allocation of public spending in
East Timor indicates that the government is spending more—in terms of both cash
transfers to the population and public investment allocation to clients—in the districts
most strongly supportive of the coalition partners in the 2007 election.34 Viewing these
various public spending measures in the best possible light, the government is acting to
‘buy the peace’, distributing rents to key constituencies in order to pacify dissent, dampen
conflict and maintain stability. A more ominous telling is that Timorese elites are
consolidating a predatory grip on power through the capture and strategic distribution of
major patronage streams. Growing public resentment and intra-elite competition combine
with still weakly institutionalised administrative and political arenas to produce an
atmosphere of persistent insecurity.
Afghanistan
When the Northern Alliance and the US military liberated Kabul from the Taliban in
November 2001, Afghanistan had suffered over two decades of conflict, with its anti-
imperialist war against the Soviet Union morphing into a civil war of fluid mujahedeen
alliances. Afghanistan in 2001 was considered the classic failed state, characterised by
severely fragmented social structures and a barely existent central state infrastructure. The
international community’s commitment to reconstructing post-conflict Afghanistan
raised the profile of peace-building in the global public consciousness; and a great deal of
international assistance of various forms has been poured into the country.35 The Bonn


































Agreement of December 2001 provided the roadmap for Afghan political and institutional
transformation, with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
established to support its implementation. The partnership between UNAMA and the
Afghan Interim and Transitional Administrations, both led by Hamid Karzai, was at the
centre of the transitional governance experience.
Ten years later, the deep elite power struggles at the heart of Afghanistan’s political
instability persist. Early successes in constitution-making and elections gave way to a
deteriorating security environment and setbacks in terms of effective and legitimate
governance. Afghanistan’s foremost challenge to democratic consolidation comes from
subnational strongmen at the head of complex patronage networks endowed with
alternative sources of power, legitimacy and economic rents from those of the central
government. The Karzai regime has increasingly built its own clientelist base in the
provinces by distributing government positions to allies; in return, this network delivers
electoral returns, with tribal leaders warned that if they fail to support the regime they will
be excluded from local government and its attendant patronage spoils in the form of jobs,
aid and other privileges.36 The international community’s strategy of prioritising the
stabilisation of the country through a combination of democratisation and political deal-
making has acted against the peace-building imperative precisely by reinforcing traditional
fragmentary loci of power, many of which have now come to operate in zero-sum
opposition to the central state rather than in co-operation with it.
The need to deal with powerful political elites—by either neutralising or incorporating
them—continues to be the major obstacle besetting both state-building and democratic
consolidation in Afghanistan. Appointed by the centre, many provincial governors and
district officers received their posts because of their independent and traditional power
bases. Among the 249 legislators elected to the first national assembly, for example, were 40
commanders still linked to militias; and nearly half of all MPs weremujahedeen veterans of
the war against the Soviets in the 1980s.37 The patronage culture associated with the
militias has yet to be replaced by government and civil society institutions that offer public
services in an accountable manner. A frequent complaint of Afghans living in Kandahar,
for example, is that life has reverted to the chaos under warring mujahedeen factions.38
Initially appointed in recognition of their power and granted renewed legitimacy through
the transitional governance process, most subnational leaders have further entrenched
their predatory activities and bolstered their patronage networks. These warlords—both a
cause and a consequence of insecurity—have developed sophisticated political-economic


































strategies, carefully husbanding their resources and tapping into international support in
order to sustain their power bases.39
The political consolidation problem in Afghanistan has been twofold. On the one hand,
the Karzai government has not been able to extricate its reliance on the successful warlords
(among the ‘winners’ at the end of the conflict) associated with the Northern Alliance, who
pose problems for the legitimacy and authority of the central government. On the other
hand, the political process in Afghanistan has been unable—since the transitional and
current Afghan governments and its foreign backers were simply unwilling—to incorporate
the ‘losers’, i.e., the Taliban. Steadily increasing clashes with a resurgent Taliban have further
emphasised the central government’s challenges in broadcasting legitimate authority
throughout the country—especially after 2006, when the Taliban stepped up its campaign
of instability and attacks against the government, central and provincial.40
Those dynamics—which have resulted both from the narrowness of the Bonn peace deal
and the transitional governance strategy itself—have contributed to a lack of consolidation
in democratic governance. The transitional governance process privileged and legitimised
Karzai at the centre and subnational elites in the provinces, many of whom are now
enmeshed in a predatory political economy equilibrium where state structures are
captured. The drug economy and other avenues of patronage and corruption have both
created pockets of stability in some parts of the country and fuelled socio-political
breakdown and violent conflict in others.41 Drug-related corruption has undermined both
state capacity and the government’s legitimacy; political groups out of power, including
the Taliban, use the widespread patronage and corruption to perpetuate a sense of injustice
and legitimise continued fighting against the government. The transitional governance
process through which the international community instinctively pursued political
stabilisation was co-opted by domestic elites into this conflictual patronage environment.
The Afghan state remains splintered, both politically and administratively—in turn
making the quest for sustainable peace in the country elusive.
The predatory political economy of insecurity
In Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan, the UN attempted to alter the domestic
political game by facilitating a process of administrative and political institutional
engineering by domestic elites. Few would deny that some success in democracy-building
has been achieved in each case, setbacks notwithstanding. On the state-building front,


































moreover, even though government effectiveness and institutional quality remain low,
each country has developed some degree of state infrastructure and a public service
delivery footprint. In these respects, the conclusions of this paper are in no way intended
to imply that any of the three countries considered here are worse off than they otherwise
would have been as a result of peace-building through transitional governance. Indeed,
they are all fundamentally more stable than before the interventions and maintain a basic
degree of the government effectiveness and accountability that are the hallmarks of the
modern state.
Nevertheless, the evidence from Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan indicates that
the implicit theory behind the strategy of peace-building through transitional governance
is fundamentally flawed in both concept and practice and leads to predictable
disappointments in long-term governance outcomes. The evidence from the cases
demonstrates that no matter how well administrative and political institutions are tailored
in design, during the course of transitional governance, in practice, powerful domestic
groups co-opt and dominate the institutional choice process and subsequently consolidate
their holds on power, damaging the prospects for democratic governance. The liberal
peace-building model brings with it significant resources and, in turn, the allocation and
control of those resources become a new site of power for elites.42 Through the transitional
governance process—and its unique need for a counterpart to help govern—the UN
enables certain domestic elites to entrench themselves in power and, in turn, bestows
legitimacy upon them through democratic elections along with the other power and
patronage resources that come with control of the state.
As transitional governance becomes co-opted by domestic elites intent on remaining in
power, a predatory political economy dynamic sets in. The patterns of predation are
familiar to observers of developing countries—especially those where there are large and
exclusive benefits to holding power.43 In an environment where institutions are weak and
the shadow of the future is of uncertain length, time horizons are short and politics
becomes a zero-sum game. Elites benefitting from predation while in power, and fearing
the consequences of losing office, use the resources of the state as political patronage and
hijack the process of consolidation of autonomous state structures. The state comes to
mirror the political balance, instead of becoming the necessary countervailing arena of
authority and legitimacy. In a perverse way, the pursuit of electoral democracy makes this
problem worse, because it increases the size of the ‘selectorate’, or the fraction of society
that is allowed to choose the political leadership, without meaningfully affecting the size of


































the ‘winning coalition’, or the fraction of the selectorate that enables the leadership to stay
in power.44 The resulting elite incentives mean that predatory rent-seeking and narrow
patronage distribution to key supporters will be relatively high and broad-based public
goods provision correspondingly low.
The cases illustrate in subtly different ways how this core dynamic of predatory state
capture is perversely enabled through the transitional governance model’s simultaneous
pursuit of state- and democracy-building. In Cambodia, the UN emphasised a quick route
to elections to excise the hostile Khmer Rouge from the legitimate body politic; but this
strengthened the hand of Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s Party (CPP). UNTAC’s
reliance on the CPP as its de facto counterpart in administering the country during the
transitional period served to further entrench the CPP in the state apparatus; and defeat in
the country’s first election was not enough to sever that grip. Over time, Hun Sen and the
CPP have manoeuvred their way into a hegemonic regime for which elections and the
power-sharing formula stipulated by the constitution are merely window dressing. The
Cambodian state is captured by this elite and its extensive and pervasive patronage
networks.
East Timor’s major peace-building hurdle after the independence referendum was the
hollowed-out state infrastructure left behind when the Indonesian government pulled out of
the tiny nation. UNTAETallowed only a limited degree of Timorese participation in executive
and administrative management of the country during the transitional period, with the
rationale that it wanted to maintain its neutrality in Timorese politics. Yet it mishandled the
growing demands for increased Timorisation by again anointing as its preferred counterparts
a small, yet powerful clique of leaders—the core of FRETILIN. These elites failed to translate
their electoral mandate into inclusive policies for the Timorese population and the country’s
reconstruction. Intra-elite schisms, in the absence of countervailing state authority, spiralled
into renewed violent conflict. The country’s current leadership perpetuates a hierarchical
governance structure as well as the reliance on patronage distribution for political support;
and a predatory dynamic that continues to undermine governance appears to be intensifying
as a result of East Timor’s natural resource rent streams.
In Afghanistan, the tension between state- and democracy-building formed the core of
the international community’s dilemma in developing a peace-building strategy. It was
framed as the struggle between the imperative to stabilise the country and the goal of
giving the long-war-torn country a new lease on democratic nationhood. The UN and the
United States assumed that for the state to function at all, the loci of power held by the


































mujahedeen leaders would have to be incorporated into the new government, and Karzai
invited these warlords to serve in his cabinet and as his provincial governors. Once
bestowed with this legitimacy, these well-resourced veterans of Afghan political society
were adept in consolidating their own patron-client networks; and elites around Karzai
have done the same. The result is a weak and fragmentary state that struggles to resource its
minimal activity and defend the country against the predatory rent-seeking and violence
perpetuated by entrenched political elites at both the central and subnational levels.
Patterns of predation differ across the three countries, to be sure—with two major
elements of variation being the degree to which elites co-operate in predation and,
relatedly, the level of politically motivated conflict that persists as a result. Cambodian
elites across the political spectrum appear to be enmeshed in a system of co-operative
predation where patronage has replaced outright violence in seeking electoral support. In
East Timor, with the group in power controlling the levers of patronage distribution, intra-
elite schisms persist and underlay a volatile insecurity. In Afghanistan, patterns of
predation manifest themselves in a more conflictual manner, with multiple patron-client
networks engaged in persistent conflict. One way of understanding this variation in future
research might lie in the degree to which patron-client bonds align with political parties.
Where subnational patrons are traditionally strong, such as in Afghanistan, national elites
will find it easier to rely upon local leaders even when this strategy creates personal
fiefdoms. In contrast, if competition among patrons is high and instrumental ties more
common, for example in Cambodia, parties can create their own new linkages, but at the
expense of higher patronage distribution.45
These differences notwithstanding, the stakes of control over the state are extremely
high in each case. Patron-client relationships are not coercive, but rather instrumental and
centred on reciprocal exchange—the patron uses his influence and resources to provide
benefits or protection to the client, who reciprocates with political support and personal
services.46 Electoral systems spur competition among elites for the necessary voter
followings and increase the size of the patronage distribution necessary for client support.
The absence of strong institutions, in turn, only exacerbates the reliance on patron-client
networks as the source of political power. Finally, the survival or demise of political elites,
in a newly institutionalising system, depends on the success of their network at tapping
patronage resources for distribution. Thus, once entrenched, and fearing the consequences
of losing power, elites face very short time horizons that lead to a vicious circle—elites with
high discount rates increase predation in the present time period; they also have less


































incentive to invest in institutional capacity, thus failing to lengthen time horizons and
intensifying the current stakes. A predatory political economy is a self-reinforcing
equilibrium: when the stakes include survival, political elites are willing to retain power by
any means, including predation, even as they erode social cohesion.47 Elites that try to
maintain stability through coercion and patronage risk future episodes of conflict—and a
cycle of insecurity persists.
Conclusions and implications
International attempts at peace-building in post-conflict countries have been predicated
on the belief that the assistance of third parties can address the root causes of conflict by
transforming the socio-political dynamics and context that led to violence in the first
place. I have argued in this paper that the United Nations, in its strategy of peace-building
through transitional governance, acts on an implicit theory about how best to change the
domestic political game in order to create the foundations for sustainable peace. Yet this
approach to peace-building falls short of achieving effective and legitimate governance
because the domestic elites empowered by the international community consolidate their
own holds on power in a zero-sum political-economic calculus that enables and relies on
predation and patronage.
Most perversely, the democracy-building and state-strengthening dimensions of the
strategy of peace-building through transitional governance act at cross-purposes to each
other in the attempt to reorient the domestic political game away from conflict. At the very
core of the tension is a simple conundrum: the international community needs
counterparts for state-building but it must attempt to be neutral in democracy-building.
The transitional governance model essentially takes a short cut on the state-building side
by relying on specific elites as local counterparts and agents of change, instead of putting in
the time and investment for meaningful processes of political participation and
institutionalisation such as party-building. Choosing a counterpart in this manner means
that the UN essentially bestows legitimacy upon an entrenched elite and endows it with
some measure of control over the state apparatus—as observed in the cases above. The
failures of these transitional governance experiments to consolidate some measure of
autonomous capacity in the state makes it ripe for patronage pickings—and powerful
elites use their control over state resources to manoeuvre within the new political-
economic landscape and ensure their on-going hegemony.


































It is possible to argue that the political economy of patronage is simply to be expected
in post-conflict states, that collusive rent-seeking among elites and the distribution of benefits
through patron-client networks is simply the price of peace and is preferable to outright
conflict.48 In this line of thinking, moreover, the political economy of predation may actually
represent a secular improvement in the post-conflict country’s journey fromwar to sustainable
peace, with patronage systems representing a form of routinisation of political economy in a
thinly institutionalised environment. Yet the goal of the international community in peace-
building is to institute effective and legitimate government as the basis for sustainable peace,
not stand by as patronage and predation contribute to persistent insecurity.
International interventions can only help in crafting lasting peace by understanding the
political economy of conflict persistence and the potential levers for altering, rather than
enabling and perpetuating, those dynamics. Four interrelated policy implications emerge.
First is the need to avoid picking winners during the transitional period and thereby
locking in a particular domestic power configuration. The goal here would be to enforce
uncertainty rather than inevitability about who will take the reins of power at transition. If
elites are uncertain about their prospects, they will be more willing to agree on
institutional arrangements that make elite alternation more likely.49 The one-shot game of
constitution-writing introduced by the transitional governance process is problematic
because elites with short-time horizons will write rules that entrench themselves in power.
The possibility of revising the rules of the game at several defined future intervals could, by
contrast, encourage moderation in institutional design.
Second, to similarly prevent state capture by anointed elites, a gradual and more
expansive course of peace-building that defers elections and focuses on institutionalisation
seems inescapable.50 Yet postponing elections does not mean that participation has to be
attenuated. Non-electoral forms of national- and local-level input can be brought into
policy-making and accountability mechanisms—through, for example, traditional
consensus institutions such as the Afghan Loya Jirga, or grand council meeting, or the
Timorese Nahe Biti Bo’ot system of conflict resolution handled by village elders.
Third, on the political institutionalisation front, party-building is essential because, in
terms of the political economy perspective advocated here, it cuts into the vicious circle of
weak credibility. Parties serve, in other words, as institutionalised mechanisms to enhance
the credibility of the political elite and thus reorient their incentives towards providing
broad-based programmatic policies and public goods rather than distributing narrow
patronage spoils.51


































Lastly, the international community would do well to emphasise alternative
mechanisms for building the state-society compact, particularly from the ground up.
Potential models include decentralised development programmes like Cambodia’s Seila
community programme, aimed at increasing local-level participation, and Afghanistan’s
National Solidarity Programme, a similar community-level block grant initiative. The
risk with such programmes may be that they fail to build state institutions; but at least
they enhance participation and ensure some element of programmatic, non-
instrumental service delivery. A complementary tactic could be the contracting out of
service delivery to the agents that can best perform the function—be they enclaves
within government, donors, non-governmental organisations or private companies.52
The goal is for international donors to focus their partnerships with post-conflict
governments on providing public services—thereby undercutting the value to elites of
providing particularistic benefits.
The transitional governance model of peace-building, with its static emphasis on
institutional form as outcome, has been co-opted in implementation by post-conflict
elites. A more subtle approach attuned to institutional function would instead focus on
building credibility and accountability, such that elites and their supporters have the
incentives to compromise on a programmatic basis over time. The predatory political
economy of insecurity is a state between persistent conflict and sustainable peace, a mutual
enterprise that benefits competing elites in an equilibrium suboptimal for the rest of
society. Only if all domestic stakeholders can benefit from the alternative will a negotiated
resolution be possible. Crucially, along the lines offered above, actors must be given the
incentives to build institutions and state capacity to lengthen the shadow of the future and
alleviate the commitment problems that lead to predation.53 Just as recent scholarship has
emphasised that the factors shaping the onset of war must be separated from the dynamics
of conflict,54 so must the dynamics of post-conflict political economy be understood as yet
another logic. Only if we understand the political economy of persistent conflict and
insecurity will the international community be able to shape interventions that can alter
those dynamics and thereby craft lasting peace.
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